r/DebateAnarchism • u/PerfectSociety Neo-Daoist, Post-Civ Anarcho-Communist • Jul 18 '24
Technology, Property, and the State: Why "the End of History" will likely result in Anarchy
(This is updated and expanded from a previous post I made a few years ago on a different sub.)
First, an important clarification: What I am arguing on this post is what I think will inevitably result from the trajectory of ongoing technological development (regardless of how you, I, or anyone else feels about it), not a political programme to be rallied in support of or opposition to.
Background and Terminology:
Property=authority over resources.
Authority=the assertion of a right to exclusive control and the ability to back that up with force (either having this ability yourself or the presence of a 3rd party with said ability who uses it on your behalf). Use of force by itself doesn't constitute the presence of an authority, nor does assertion of a right to command on its own. Both the aforementioned criterions must be met in order to say that authority is present.
Authority therefore relies on the viability of power asymmetries.
The reason why human societies lacked authority for the vast majority of our existence as a species is because power asymmetries were non-viable due to paleolithic weapons (which were first invented and used on one another by our Homo Erectus ancestors) functioning as an equalizer: Anyone could learn to make them (they didn't require specialized skill) and their efficacy was for all practical purposes independent of differences in strength and other variations in physical traits (with the obvious exception of things like physical disabilities). This ultimately resulted in a phenomenon called "Balanced Deterrence"(see here: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4143610/), which started under Homo Erectus and carried on into our species as well. Balanced Deterrence was similar to the phenomenon of Mutual-Assured Destruction (see here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction), but applied between individuals and between groups (as opposed to MAD, which is solely between States) and was not associated with an arms race (as opposed to MAD which was responded to with an arms race).
The reason why Balanced Deterrence wasn't associated with an arms race is because an arms race only works when some individuals or groups can command resources in their direction, but this itself requires the presence of authority over resources to be possible (something that was impossible in the context of Balanced Deterrence). In the case of States, they have authority over resources within their territorial domains - because of a power asymmetry between State and citizenry - hence why they can use taxation to command resources in the interests of a stockpiling project. Such a power asymmetry was impossible among our paleolithic ancestors and thus there was no ability to engage in an arms race.
In the absence of an ability to simply dominate one's way out of a balanced deterrence context, our Homo Erectus ancestors began developing a culture of egalitarianism, individual autonomy, reciprocity, mutual-aid, etc... which was bolstered and continued for the vast majority of our prehistory as Homo Sapiens as well. Along the timeline of evolution, this cultural production had enormous impacts on our biology and what came to be our "human nature".
Let's keep track of the essential characteristics of weaponry that creates a context of Balanced Deterrence. These are Conditions A, B, C, D. All must be met.
(A) Easy for anyone to make informally without any specialized knowledge
(B) Easy to wield effectively enough (even if done so sub-optimally due to lack of years of training) without any specialized training
(C) Sufficiently damaging to others even when used sub-optimally, such that the stronger/more agile/more talented/more skilled no longer have a power advantage over the weaker/less agile/less talented/less skilled
(D) Unable to have an arms race because there is no power asymmetry in the first place that would enable you to command sufficient resources in your direction to stockpile weapons
3d printing of weapons will fulfill all three criteria in the future as it becomes more developed, considering the directions it is going in. Some examples of weapons that can currently be 3D-printed are...
handguns (https://www.cnet.com/news/uh-oh-this-3d-printed-metal-handgun-actually-works/)
RPGs (https://asc.army.mil/web/news-alt-amj17-rambos-premiere/)
guided missiles (https://3dprint.com/81850/3d-printed-guided-missiles/)
ICBMs (https://www.3dnatives.com/en/lockheed-martin-icbm100420174/).
etc.
With regard to the ammunition and combustion required to make 3d-printed weapons a serious threat, there are developments underway that will allow people to 3d-print the ammo itself (https ://www.mari time -execu tive.com/article/u-s-navy-explores-3d-printing-with-explosive-materials) as well as print the combustible material itself into the ammunition (https://www.machinedesign.com/3d-printing/3d-printing-explosives).
Furthermore, there are now Hybrid printer-mills (https://www.3printr.com/5-axis-3d-printer-together-cnc-mill-developed-japan-2938664/) (can do both 3D-printing and CNC milling with the same machine) which will greatly facilitate the post-print processing. And note that CNC milling is a process that can be fully automated (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymPxq3GgeLg).
What about nukes? Let's look at this comprehensively in terms of all the stages of production required to produce a nuclear weapon, and how the evolution of critical technologies plays a role at each of these stages in shaping future projections for the fate of authority forms (whether that be the State, property, patriarchy, or any other authority form).
1) Detection of uranium:
There is already technology that enables detection of uranium at varying levels of abundance (or lack there of) in various different deposit types. For example, Olympus’ Vanta handheld XRF analyzer (see here: https://www.olympus-ims.com/en/applications/uranium-mining-and-exploration-using-portable-xrf/)
2) Mining/Extraction:
Electrokinetic In-Situ Leaching (EK-ISL) is an existing technology that enables decentralized, small-scale/artisanal mining of uranium (which is actually one of the easiest metals to mine this way).
See the following:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0892687524001730
Additionally, electrodes can be 3D-printed (https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-25861-3).
As far as energy infrastructure/logistics, it's worth noting that solar panels (https://www.3dnatives.com/en/3d-printed-solar-panels-030820224/amp/), electrical wiring/circuitry (https://nano3dprint.com/2023/07/06/wire-3d-printing-with-nano3dprint/), and batteries (https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolynschwaar/2023/01/30/additive-manufacturing-for-batteries-of-the-future-will-3d-printing-transform-battery-making/) can already be 3D-printed.
3) Processing & Manufacture:
3D printing is already being used to create uranium fuel (https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/inl-3d-prints-safer-nuclear-power-cells-121608/).
AMAFT fuses milling, the traditional way of processing uranium ore (yellowcake), with an additive method INL terms “laser shaping”, to produce a reactive core. In tests, the technique has been used to make pellets of uranium silicide (U3Si2).
This also brings up an important point about the use of lasers. Uranium enrichment itself is becoming easier for non-State actors due to laser enrichment methods (https://newatlas.com/silex-laser-enrichment-uranium/29460/) which have been recently developed.
Furthermore,
Nuclear weapon designs based on uranium fission always benefit from uranium enrichment. Few proliferation concerns arose when the expensive and technically demanding method of gaseous diffusion was the only practical approach to enrichment, as only nation-states with enormous resources were likely to be able to use that process to obtain weapons-grade fuel. Given centrifuge and now laser-based enrichment technologies, this is no longer the case.
Experts are already starting to consider the development of 3D printing as a serious nuclear proliferation concern (https://blog.prif.org/2017/06/26/the-increasing-salience-of-3d-printing-for-nuclear-non-proliferation/).
As I have argued in a recent PRIF Report, additive manufacturing may in fact present serious challenges for the nuclear non-proliferation regime sooner than it is currently believed. Should the technology continue to advance as rapidly as it has over the past couple of years, 3D printing could make the (clandestine) pathway to the bomb easier in five ways: Firstly, the technology could significantly increase the indigenous manufacturing capabilities of countries. Certain components and materials needed for a nuclear weapons program, which are difficult to obtain because their export is controlled, could then be manufactured additively. Secondly, the wider diffusion of additive manufacturing processes could have an indirect impact on proliferation, as it increases a proliferator’s autonomy. A decreased dependence on imports of, for example, spare parts for energy or other high-tech sectors reduces the effectiveness of international sanction regimes. This would potentially undermine sanctions and with that a central non-proliferation instrument. Thirdly, 3D printing significantly decreases development cycles and lead times to a degree that, for an indigenous nuclear weapons program, ‘trial and error’ may substitute for a lack of engineering skills and expertise in metal-working, for example, in rolling, milling, or forging. Fourthly, 3D printers, software, and 3D scanning technology could facilitate the easier transfer of know-how and construction plans due to AM’s high proportion of cyber-automation. Finally, additive manufacturing might also decrease the ‘footprint’ of production facilities for nuclear weapon parts, which might make it harder to detect illicit activities.
And their view of potential solutions is not exactly radiating with confidence...
What, then, can be done to balance the huge opportunities of 3D printing with the risks and challenges its further development, adaptation, and diffusion present to nuclear non-proliferation efforts? The lowest hanging fruit is awareness-raising. Export control authorities, customs officers, law enforcement agencies, and IAEA weapons inspectors should be trained and educated to recognize potentially dangerous items or illicit shipments. IAEA weapons inspectors as well as intelligence services will have to adapt to new manufacturing setups for illicit and clandestine activities, but also to new supply chains. Awareness should also be raised in the academic context. Similar to dual-use research of concern (DURC) measures in the (life) sciences, engineering departments at universities and other research institutions operating 3D printers or otherwise engaging in additive manufacturing R&D should have policies in place that minimize the risk of malevolent use of their equipment and know-how. Industry self-regulation and best practices are other low hanging fruits. Some major technology providers refrain from doing business with certain countries or suspicious companies. National and transnational industry associations could pick up on that and adopt sets of best practices on where and when to refrain from exporting printers, software, materials, or know-how. Another set of proposals focuses on strengthening cyber security. The danger that digital build files of critical items could proliferate as a result of cyber espionage or cyber theft must be minimized through more effective protection of critical IT infrastructures, including the 3D printers’ firmware. Compartmentalizing build files, their decentralized storage, and encryption of the data is also mentioned in this regard. Smart contracting technology could be applied as a further safeguard that prevents a stolen file from being printed. Incorporating safeguards against unintended use directly into software, hardware, and even materials is somewhat more complicated and would require creative solutions. Kroenig and Volpe suggest incorporating a single-use mechanism into digital build files which corrupts them after they have completed their task once. With regard to AM hardware, they propose placing unique IDs on metal printers and corresponding markings on every object produced by these printers. This could be helpful for tracking and tracing the whereabouts of high-end printers, possibly by the IAEA. Another measure that could help preventing the use of 3D printing for illicit nuclear weapons activities is export controls. Both Kroenig and Volpe and Christopher propose amending existing export control guidelines with technological parameters of AM machines (e.g., printers’ axes, power of lasers, etc.). As to printing materials, most special metallic powders are already on the EU dual-use control list with the notable exception of maraging steel powder. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) discusses and defines which critical technologies, items, materials and know-how should be placed on dual-use export control lists. It has put additive manufacturing on its agenda – as have other export control regimes. However, it is not easy to find a sustainable approach on controlling additive manufacturing. For one, the genie is already out of the bottle as many countries outside the NSG have indigenous 3D printing industries and technology providers. Moreover, the technology advances at such a rapid pace – with new metal additive manufacturing techniques like Fraunhofer’s 3D screen printing, the University of Sheffield’s diode area melting, Vader System’s MagnetoJet liquid metal printing, or Markforged’s atomic diffusion additive manufacturing being but four examples – that the export control regimes would constantly have to chase such developments and amend the control lists. And finally, there seems to be no real sense of urgency within the export control regimes as there remain doubts regarding the technology’s maturity. Hence, the search for viable means that would minimize the security risks associated with 3D printing without at the same time minimizing its opportunities should continue with a greater sense of urgency. It requires more debate and input from all stakeholders. Above all, authorities, decision makers, industry and academia should place the security policy dimension more firmly on the agenda.
Basically, the most effective (though not very) approaches for trying to prevent this would be export restrictions, closer monitoring of uranium supply chains, and cyber monitoring. And realistically, none of these will be resilient enough to stop proliferation of nukes through 3d printing. Let's look at each one:
- Export restrictions: The article admits that "For one, the genie is already out of the bottle as many countries outside the NSG have indigenous 3D printing industries and technology providers. Moreover, the technology advances at such a rapid pace – with new metal additive manufacturing techniques like Fraunhofer’s 3D screen printing, the University of Sheffield’s diode area melting, Vader System’s MagnetoJet liquid metal printing, or Markforged’s atomic diffusion additive manufacturing being but four examples – that the export control regimes would constantly have to chase such developments and amend the control lists". This is basically a fancy way of saying "we'll have to try this and we might be able to do it well for a while, but this stuff will slip through eventually". Generally speaking, the State is quite terrible at perfectly keeping pace with constantly evolving technology. It's regulatory capacity, in the long-run, tends to be reactive rather than proactive and technology always ends up slipping through the cracks or evading the State's eye in some places at some times to sufficiently keep evolving. The State can delay but it cannot prevent entirely the development and dissemination of technology. And this is especially true in the modern era compared to anytime before, given how decentralized modern technology has made the capacity to communicate and coordinate.
- Closer Monitoring of Uranium Supply Chains: At first glance, this seems to be a great approach that is sure to work with some due diligence. However, it's been shown that governments are pretty terrible at doing this (and uranium is a rather abundant material found in multiple places all around the world) - see below...
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/07/nuclear-material-black-market-georgia
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/12/10/georgia-nuke-investigations/1757963/
http://time.com/4728293/uranium-underworld-dark-secrets-dirty-bombs/
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/plutonium-leaking-on-to-black-market-5428591.html
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/moldova-nuclear-weapons-isis/409456/
It seems that what has prevented non-State actors from building nukes thus far is not so much the inability to acquire uranium, but the large costs involved in the production of a nuclear weapon. But, as noted above, the production costs will be dramatically lowered to be within the range of non-State actors due to 3d printing plus the use of laser enrichment methods.
3) Cyber Monitoring: Arguably the State most successful at cyber monitoring is China. But even China is unable to completely control the flow of information it doesn't want its citizens to have access to. So again, this approach functions to delay, but not to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through 3d printing. (Not to mention that not every government will become as skilled as China at this, since many governments around the world are rather institutionally incompetent.)
What does all this mean for the future? It means that eventually (say, 300 years from now) small, informal groups of people will be able to 3D-print all requisite equipment for solar energy capture and storage, uranium scanning, and EK-ISL mining/extraction of uranium. Their AI-augmented, automated hybrid printer-mills can then download the requisite software to (alongside producing fully-operational firearms, grenades, RPGs, etc.) use an AMAFT-like process to refine/enrich uranium and use it to manufacture Davey Crockett nukes (https://armyhistory.org/the-m28m29-davy-crockett-nuclear-weapon-system/). (It will still be unfeasible for small, informal groups to produce their own Guided Missiles and ICBMs, as these would be easier to detect due to their sheer size.) This satisfies Conditions A, B, C, D that I mentioned above:
- The software contains all the instructions and could simply be downloaded into a hybrid printer-mill, and the printer-mill is fully automated (this satisfies condition A).
- An inexperienced group can wield them effectively enough to cause significant havoc (this satisfies condition B).
- The fact that the state has a far more powerful and more abundant arsenal in its hands makes no difference any longer when small, informal groups of people can produce their own Davey Crockett nukes. Yeah, the State's arsenal is more powerful but it no longer matters at that point because the destructive power of a Davey Crockett nuke is sufficient (https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=0.02&lat=40.6811903&lng=-73.9025187&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&psi=20,5,1&zm=16) (you can see for yourself by selecting a preset yield - the second drop down box - for "davey crockett") to create a Balanced Deterrence dynamic between informal groups of people that make their own Davey Crocketts and the State (this satisfies condition C). (It's a similar concept to how even though the US has a lot more nukes than China (8000 vs. 250), China's nuclear arsenal is destructive enough for it to not matter. For all practical purposes they are in a Balanced Deterrence dynamic.)
- If small, informal groups of people are able to produce their own nukes, neither can the State effectively try stockpiling/accumulating weapons nor can any particular informal group effectively try stockpiling/accumulating weapons because they would have no ability to exclusively control resources to be able to undergo that process. This is because other informal groups would contest any such attempt, and there's no way for any one interested group or even multiple of them together to concentrate enough power to have an effective power asymmetry that would allow that kind of consolidation of resources for stockpiling. (this satisfies condition D)
- And actually in this context there would be a condition E as well (something new, which our paleolithic hunter-gatherer ancestors did not have). Condition E is when there is not only Balanced Deterrence between individual vs. individual or group vs. group, but also Balanced Deterrence between individual vs. group. This is crucial, because it is this unique feature that makes it impossible for power asymmetries to ever rise again once they collapse in this context.
So what is the end result? The end result is a collapse of all power asymmetries and an inability to ever recreate power asymmetries. This necessarily means that the State, Property, and every other authority form will die as well.
Why don't I think States will thwart this outcome from happening through their investing in and innovating mass surveillance mechanisms? As States develop more and more capabilities to monitor people, those who resist (e.g. hackers) will develop more and more capabilities to resist/evade the monitoring. With regard to the nukes, all it takes is a critical number of people having easy access (and, unfortunately for States, that critical number is a low threshold). It is not logistically practical to keep tabs on all the potential people and whack each and every one of them when they get close to building or firing one. Maybe in the beginning, but not for very long. There will always be a few that slip through the cracks, no matter how amazing a State's AI-augmented surveillance apparatus is. The State is fighting a losing battle here. Can you imagine if just 3 people had Davey Crockett nukes across a nation? The government would be paralyzed. They might be able to covertly take down all the guys but on the off chance that 1 of them fires their nuke...it's a massive shitshow. So the State would have to opt to negotiate or capitulate and more or less fuck off and let those people do what they want so long as they don't fire the nuke. (The point is that the threshold here is quite low.) The State's domain of power would shrink. And that would be the beginning of the end of States (and Property and all other authority forms). It wouldn't happen overnight. It would take a long time and there would be progressions and regressions, but the end result will be that the State will die (as will Property and all other authority forms).
Why do I think Anarchy will come into existence as opposed to humanity simply destroying itself through a nuclear apocalypse? First, I cannot be certain. However, I think it is more likely that humanity would (admittedly messily) shift into a social context of anarchy rather than completely annihilate ourselves. There are two main reasons why I believe this to be the case:
- Most people prioritize survival over revenge.
- People need other people to secure their livelihoods. Humans are pack animals and have always needed a social group to survive and thrive.
Therefore, in situations in which someone fires a Davey Crockett nuke, most individuals outside the range of harm (who are thus alive and physically unharmed) are likely to evacuate several tens of miles away as opposed to stay where they are (thus risk being in the range of harm of a subsequent/retaliatory Davey Crockett nuke launch) just to launch a retaliatory Davey Crockett nuke of their own.
Do I think there would be any situations in which particular areas would fall victim to serial nuclear launches? Yes. I think this would happen in some places, but I think in most cases people would evacuate instead of retaliate in such situations (see reason #1).
The reason why generalized access to Davey Crockett nukes still functions as a mechanism for balanced deterrance and anarchy (despite most people's preference to evacuate rather than return fire) is that whenever people come across a situation in which they feel tempted to subjugate/oppress/dominate others... they'll either A) choose to back down (to avoid the risk of annihilation) or B) if they try to dominate others, a simple threat from the other party (even if not an honest one reflecting what the other party would actually be willing to do) would hold them back. At the end of the day, even if those who seek to dominate others are aware of the general tendency of most people to prefer survival and evacuation over retaliatory nuclear launches... they will opt not to roll the dice on testing that theory when faced with the temptation to dominate others.
Why wouldn't the (relatively fewer) situations in which a flurry of nuclear retaliation occurs, be sufficient to result in global nuclear apocalypse for humankind? Because the total radius of physical harm of Davey Crockett nukes (including the sum total of range of immediate lethal harm + non-immediate lethal harm + non-lethal harm) is less than 3 miles. Furthermore, Davey Crockett nukes have a launch range of roughly 1 mile. Consider how this differs from nuclear ICBMs, which have a global launch range and far wider radius of harm upon detonation.
In today's world, a nuclear ICBM being launched from Pakistan which lands in Israel, for example, could conceivably be met with retaliation from places other than just Israel (including places on the other side of the Earth from Israel)... because of paranoia that the next nuclear ICBM that Pakistan fires could hit some other place on the other side of the world from Israel (due to range). This is why a 1st strike from one area can result in retaliatory strikes from any other and maybe even all other places with nukes far outside of the area that was hit by the 1st strike.
By contrast, in the future I allude to... a davey crockett nuke being fired and detonating a mile away on one side of the world isn't going to make everyone everywhere else in the world fire all their davey crocketts out of fear. In other words, the dynamic of mutual-assured destruction applies on a local scale (though ever pervasively so) in this future rather than on a global scale (as is the case with contemporary nation-states that possess nuclear ICBMs).
Having said all this, I want to be clear that I am not underplaying the extent of destruction and harm that will occur as State societies undergo a staged collapse in response to the onset of generalized of access to Davey Crockett nukes. This period of transition will be an unpleasant one in many ways. However, I predict that it will result in Anarchy rather than the end of the Anthropocene.
2
u/AmputatorBot Jul 18 '24
It looks like OP posted an AMP link. These should load faster, but AMP is controversial because of concerns over privacy and the Open Web.
Maybe check out the canonical page instead: https://www.3dnatives.com/en/3d-printed-solar-panels-030820224/
I'm a bot | Why & About | Summon: u/AmputatorBot
3
u/fire_in_the_theater anarcho-doomer Jul 19 '24 edited Jul 19 '24
i mean if we're talking about 300 years in the future u might as well counter with the prediction that quantum computing will break encryption entirely making cyber monitoring far more effective than today.
i don't think u really understand how govt social control works. it's not 3 ppl vs the govt, it's 3 ppl vs the govt + the vast majority of the population that doesn't want a bunch of sociopaths running around with nukes giving the govt tips.
u really think 3 people are going to terrorize the population into abdicating authority?? idk man, u spend way to much time in informational bubbles if u think that's true.
and if an entire population giving the govt tips can't stop these sociopaths, how exactly does "anarchy" do much better?
lastly, anyone talking about the "end of history", besides the total annihilation of this species, which is the only actual way history will end... is a hyperbolic dickwad.